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Introduction 
23.1 There were only a small number of cases dealing with the law of 
unjust enrichment and restitution in the year 2014. The most 
noteworthy case is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chan Yuen Lan v 
See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 (“Chan Yuen Lan”) which elucidated 
upon the juridical basis of the resulting trust, a matter that remains rife 
in debate in other common law jurisdictions. The decision has 
significant implications for the divide between the law of unjust 
enrichment and the law of trusts, and these implications will need to be 
carefully measured and sorted out in future cases. The remaining cases 
mainly deal with the unjust factor inquiry, both generally as well as with 
reference to specific unjust factors, namely, mistake and free acceptance. 
These judgments generally echo the sentiments of the Court of Appeal 
in two major decisions handed down in 2013, Alwie Handoyo v Tjong 
Very Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie Handoyo”) and Wee Chiaw Sek 
Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”). More than 
that, however, the 2014 judgments continue the theme of clarifying the 
“unjust” inquiry, thereby adding to the richness of the local 
jurisprudence as well as raising finer points of law for future 
consideration. 
Unjust enrichment and contract 
23.2 In Total English Learning Global Pte Ltd v Kids Counsel Pte Ltd 
[2014] SGHC 258 (“Total English Learning Global Pte Ltd”), the High 
Court dismissed a claim in unjust enrichment where the arrangement 
between the parties was governed by a valid and existing contract. The 
decision thus reaffirmed the well-established principle that a claim 
based on unjust enrichment will not be allowed if it would subvert the 
allocation of risks in a valid and existing contract between the parties: 
see Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308, discussed in 
(2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 467, para 22.6. The facts of the case that 
are relevant to the restitutionary claim may be simply stated. The 
defendant franchisees had entered into franchise agreements pursuant 
to which they were allowed to run education centres in Singapore 
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offering the “I Can Read” (“ICR”) system, a type of English literacy and 
phonics programme. The original franchisor later purportedly assigned 
the entire business, including the franchise arrangements in Singapore, 
to the plaintiffs. The validity of this assignment was contested by the 
defendant franchisees. These defendants also subsequently replaced the 
ICR system with another competitor programme, and the unused ICR 
materials were returned to the plaintiffs. These ICR materials had been 
purchased by the said defendants from the original franchisor pursuant 
to a sales arrangement that the franchisee would order the materials 
based on its specific needs and requirements without being under an 
obligation to purchase a requisite amount. 
23.3 There were multiple claims and counterclaims raised between 
the parties in the two sets of proceedings that were heard together on 
appeal to the High Court. The cause of action in unjust enrichment was 
a counterclaim brought by the aforementioned defendant franchisees 
against the plaintiffs for the price of the returned ICR materials. The 
court found that this counterclaim faced two difficulties. First, as a 
matter of contract, the return of the unused ICR materials was one of 
the obligations which the franchisee had to fulfil upon the termination 
or expiry of the agreement under the elaborate termination procedure 
prescribed in the franchise agreements; however, the agreements did not 
stipulate for the franchisor to refund the price of the returned materials. 
The court thus ruled (at [136]), and very sensibly so, that the plaintiffs’ 
receipt of the unused ICR materials “could not give rise to any claim in 
restitution”. In other words, the court was saying that the contract 
between the parties had already allocated the risks and there was 
therefore no room for restitution. One might have thought that the 
defendants could have argued for an implied term of reasonable 
remuneration instead. However, such an argument would probably fail 
as well, in light of the elaborate prescription of the termination 
procedure that arguably rendered the lack of provision of refund as an 
intentional allocation of risks as opposed to a “gap” in the contract that 
should be plugged. 
23.4 The second difficulty with the unjust enrichment claim relates 
to the failure to establish a relevant “unjust factor”, a core ingredient of 
the claim. This will be discussed below at paras 23.21–23.24. 
Unjust enrichment and trusts 
23.5 In (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 476–477, paras 22.30–22.31, it 
was noted that in See Fong Mun v Chan Yuen Lan [2013] 3 SLR 685, the 
High Court, without deciding on the issue, offered some reflections on 
the debate as to the juridical nature of the resulting trust. Essentially, 
there are two competing schools of thought: (a) Robert Chambers’ 
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“absence of intention” thesis; and (b) the “presumed intention” 
rationalisation, which is often attributed to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
judgment in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 708 (“Westdeutsche”). An appeal from 
this decision afforded the Court of Appeal in Chan Yuen Lan (above, 
para 23.1) an opportunity to revisit this jurisprudential debate that it did 
not conclusively resolve in the earlier case of Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan 
Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 (“Lau Siew Kim”). 
23.6 Chambers’ “lack of intention” analysis was affirmed to be the 
“more sensible basis for the principled yet pragmatic development of 
this equitable doctrine”: Chan Yuen Lan at [44]. The Court of Appeal 
was, nevertheless, mindful that accepting such an account of the 
resulting trust could potentially blur the distinctions between unjust 
enrichment claims and claims based on resulting trust, and that this 
could adversely affect third parties’ rights and the security of 
commercial transactions. It was also clarified that Westdeutsche was 
cited in Lau Siew Kim for the limited purpose of setting out the 
situations in which a resulting trust would arise: Chan Yuen Lan at [43]. 
Taken in totality, therefore, the judgment in Chan Yuen Lan rejects 
Chambers’ wider thesis that the resulting trust is a vehicle of proprietary 
restitution; or, in other words, that it could be explained by the law of 
unjust enrichment: see Rachel Leow & Timothy Liau, “Resulting Trusts: 
A Victory for Unjust Enrichment” (2014) 73 Camb LJ 500. 
23.7 Chan Yuen Lan’s pronouncement in this regard is consistent 
with the judicial trend under Singapore law to keep unjust enrichment 
and equity separate. In Anna Wee (above, para 23.1), the Court of 
Appeal said (at [182]–[184]) that a remedial constructive trust will not 
be imposed on the mere proof of a cause of action in unjust enrichment; 
fault is required (discussed in (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 474–476, 
paras 22.24–22.29). Moving beyond trusts, in the context of knowing 
receipt, the Court of Appeal in the same case cautioned against 
recognising an unjust enrichment liability regime, whether concurrently 
or as a substitution for the present fault-based regime: see (2013) 14 SAL 
Ann Rev 465 at 480–482, paras 22.41–22.44. The underlying concern in 
all three branches of the law is clearly the need for commercial certainty. 
23.8 These recent developments then leave us with an interesting 
query on whether Singapore law would ever recognise a trust arising 
over a mistaken payment. The possible candidates are the constructive 
trust and the resulting trust. In Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-
British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 (“Chase Manhattan”), 
Goulding J found that a constructive trust had arisen over a mistaken 
payment at the point of receipt by the receiving bank. In Westdeutsche, 
although agreeing with the result in Chase Manhattan, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson disagreed with Goulding J’s reasoning and instead opined 
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that the constructive trust only arose at the later point when the 
recipient bank had knowledge of the mistake: Westdeutsche at 714–715. 
It is apparent that Lord Browne-Wilkinson was referring to an 
institutional constructive trust. However, the ingredients of a successful 
cause of action in unjust enrichment coupled with the recipient’s 
knowledge of the mistake could give rise to a remedial constructive trust 
under Singapore law, based on the Court of Appeal’s obiter comments in 
Anna Wee. To also recognise an institutional constructive trust 
following Goulding J’s reasoning in Chase Manhattan would 
undoubtedly render the remedial constructive trust in the context of 
mistaken payment otiose. Indeed, the ratio in Chase Manhattan has not 
been followed in any Singapore decision. Quite to the contrary, the local 
courts have noted that it stands at odds with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
reinterpretation in Westdeutsche: see Public Prosecutor v Intra Group 
(Holdings) Co Inc [1999] 1 SLR(R) 154 (“PP v Intra Group”) at [46]; 
Re Pinkroccade Educational Services Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 789 
at [15]–[22]. 
23.9 As for the possibility of awarding a proprietary remedy through 
the resulting trust, Chan Yuen Lan would certainly pre-empt such an 
argument. It is also noteworthy that the House of Lords in Westdeutsche 
had overruled the earlier English decision in Sinclair v Brougham [1914] 
AC 398, a case in which a proprietary remedy was awarded for a 
payment made in pursuance to a mistake of law. The remedy, as 
explained by Viscount Haldane in the same case (with whom Lord 
Atkinson agreed), was “in the nature of a resulting trust, with no active 
character”: Sinclair v Brougham at 421. The English developments were 
noted locally in PP v Intra Group whereby the Court of Appeal agreed 
that Sinclair v Brougham was a difficult decision. The court in fact went 
as far to suggest that even if the case was correct in result, it might be 
better reasoned as giving rise to a remedial constructive trust: PP v Intra 
Group at [46]. 
Unjust factors 
Identifying a recognised unjust factor 
23.10 Echoing the observations by the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee 
(above, para 23.1) at [130] and [134] regarding the nature of the unjust 
inquiry in an unjust enrichment claim (discussed at (2013) 14 SAL Ann 
Rev 465 at 471, para 22.17), the High Court in Koh Sin Chong Freddie v 
Singapore Swimming Club [2015] 1 SLR 1240 (“Freddie Koh”) reiterated 
that “the court does not order restitution based on broad notions of 
what is fair or just”, nor is restitution awarded based on “a defendant’s 
wrongdoing”: Freddie Koh at [209]. It clarified in very simple terms that 
the injustice lies in the deprivation of “a claimant of a benefit that he has 
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conferred upon the defendant”: Freddie Koh at [209]. The defendant’s 
wrongdoing might well be the cause of the deprivation but it is not the 
focus of the law of unjust enrichment, nor is that a requisite ingredient 
of the claim. As such, a mistaken conferral of benefit provides a basis for 
restitution because the claimant has no intention to enrich the recipient 
had he known the true state of facts, leaving the recipient with an 
unjustified windfall: see Freddie Koh at [210]. It does not matter that the 
claimant’s mistake is self-induced, or even a careless one: see Kelly v 
Solaris (1841) 152 ER 24. 
23.11 It also follows that identifying the basis for reversing the 
enrichment is crucial to the success of a claim in unjust enrichment. In 
(2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 465–466, para 22.3, it was noted that the 
Court of Appeal in Alwie Handoyo (above, para 23.1) stressed that the 
old form of “money had and received” did not state a cause of action, 
and that many actions pleaded under this form would now be 
understood as part of the law of unjust enrichment. As such, the Court 
of Appeal instructed that claimants “should be precise in elucidating the 
basis of their restitutionary claims”: Alwie Handoyo at [125]. This means 
that claimants should identify the constituent ingredients of their unjust 
enrichment claims: (a) enrichment; (b) “at the expense of ”; and 
(c) a recognised unjust factor. 
23.12 The High Court in Lo Man Heng v UBS AG [2014] SGHC 134 
(“Lo Man Heng”) and Khor Liang Ing Grace v Nie Jianmin [2014] 
4 SLR 1197 (“Khor Liang Ing Grace”) gave further guidance on 
identifying a recognised unjust factor. In Lo Man Heng, the plaintiffs, 
who were the former customers of the defendant bank, claimed that the 
defendant had wrongfully paid the balances in the plaintiffs’ accounts to 
a third party when the plaintiffs’ accounts were closed. The defendant 
contended that the payments were authorised by the plaintiffs. In the 
event that the defendant was found liable to the plaintiffs, as a fallback, 
the defendant sought to be reimbursed by the third party on the basis of 
unjust enrichment. Judith Prakash J ultimately ruled that the plaintiff ’s 
claim was to be dismissed as the payments were indeed authorised by 
the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Prakash J went on to express her views on 
the other issues that were submitted before the court. In respect of the 
unjust enrichment claim, she was of the view that it would have 
succeeded on the basis that the defendant had paid the third party 
under a causative mistake that it was acting under the plaintiffs’ 
instructions. The claim would have been successful notwithstanding 
that the pleading was “somewhat sparse”: Lo Man Heng at [83]. 
Although every claim in unjust enrichment must be based on a specific 
“unjust factor”, as a matter of pleading, Prakash J iterated the well-
established rule in civil procedure that the plaintiff is only required to 
(Lo Man Heng at [81]): 
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… plead material facts on which it relies for its claim and does not 
need to plead the evidence by which those facts are to be proved or the 
legal basis of the claim. 
In this regard, the defendant’s pleadings which clearly supported a claim 
based on “want of authority” – an unjust factor that was rejected by the 
Court of Appeal in Alwie Handoyo – was found to be sufficient to imply 
a mistaken payment. 
23.13 In Khor Liang Ing Grace, the executor of the deceased’s estate 
sought to remove a caveat filed by N against a grant of probate. N had 
lodged a caveat on the basis that she had made a loan to the deceased 
before he passed away, and she was claiming the alleged sum from the 
deceased’s estate. N claimed that she had only made the loan to the 
deceased pursuant to her husband’s assurance that the deceased was 
financially sound and would repay the money. In considering the issue 
of whether N had a caveatable interest against the deceased’s estate, the 
court considered, amongst other arguments, N’s claim in unjust 
enrichment. The court ruled that having failed to identify a recognised 
unjust factor, a bare assertion that an enrichment was received by the 
deceased at N’s expense was unjust would be insufficient to sustain the 
claim. 
23.14 In sum, therefore, counsels are well advised to take the Court of 
Appeal’s observations on the law of unjust enrichment in Alwie Handoyo 
seriously. The pleadings must be carefully crafted to disclose the 
constituent elements of the claim; pleading old forms of action such as 
“money had and received” will not be sufficient. 
Mistake 
23.15 In Freddie Koh (above, para 23.10), the High Court explained 
the nature and kind of mistake that is required for a claim in unjust 
enrichment on the basis of mistake to succeed. It endorsed (at [211]) the 
principles stated in Goff & Jones: The Law on Unjust Enrichment 
(Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell & Stephen Watterson eds) (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2011) at para 9-31, essentially, that a claimant must 
show that he had made a mistake in relation to a state of facts or law 
which is causative of his transfer of the benefit to the defendant, and 
that “he has not responded unreasonably to his doubts or unreasonably 
[run] the risk of error”. The claim will, however, be disallowed if there 
has been a compromise or settlement between the parties, or if the 
claimant is estopped from pleading the relevant mistake. 
23.16 The court further clarified that an actionable mistake is not 
confined to positively held beliefs which are incorrect, but can also 
include “sheer ignorance of something relevant to the transaction at 
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hand”: Freddie Koh at [212], citing the High Court of Australia’s decision 
in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 
175 CLR 133 (“David Securities”) at 369. Indeed, David Securities 
concerned ignorance. In that case, the plaintiff company made 
payments pursuant to a contractual provision that was rendered void by 
an Australian taxation legislation. The plaintiff company, in seeking 
restitution of the payments, claimed that the payments were made in 
ignorance of the legislation. The High Court of Australia ruled, in 
principle, that ignorance could amount to an actionable mistake and 
remitted the case to the trial court to determine, amongst other matters, 
if the mistake was a causative one. However, it could be argued that the 
ignorance in David Securities contributed to a genuine mistake: the 
plaintiffs’ ignorance of the legislation resulted in it incorrectly believing 
that payments were due to the defendant: see Weeliam Seah, 
“Mispredictions, Mistake and Unjust Enrichment” [2007] RLR 93 at 96. 
23.17 The facts of Freddie Koh, however, clearly involved an active 
mistake in the form of incorrectly held beliefs. The nub of the 
defendant’s restitutionary claim was that payments had been made to 
the plaintiff under a mistake as to the latter’s entitlement to be 
indemnified by the defendant in respect of damages and his legal costs. 
The indemnity was sourced in a resolution passed by the management 
committee of the defendant (“the Resolution”) but the defendant argued 
that the scope of the indemnity only covered liability arising from a 
proper discharge of duties. As it turned out, the plaintiff ’s liability in the 
defamation suit was ultimately held by the Court of Appeal (in separate 
proceedings) to be based on malice. After carefully examining the 
intention behind the Resolution, the High Court was not satisfied that 
there was a causative mistake. 
23.18 Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeal 
would endorse all forms of ignorance as actionable mistake. The matter 
is certainly not a settled one. It is noteworthy that the UK Supreme 
Court has recently considered this issue in Pitt v Holt [2013] 2 AC 108 
in the context of applying the law of rescinding a voluntary disposition. 
Lord Walker, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, 
opined (at [108]) that mere ignorance, even if causative, will not suffice, 
unless the court is able to infer a conscious belief or a tacit assumption. 
But as admitted by Lord Walker (at [108]), the line between mere 
ignorance and genuine mistakes is a very fine one, and could be 
incredibly difficult to draw in practice, as demonstrated by the case 
itself. As far as English law is concerned, principled exercise of judicial 
discretion will have to be relied upon to tackle this difficult task. 
Difficulties aside, Häcker has pointed out that the English concept of 
“mistake” is helpful in disposing “a number of more unsavoury gift 
hypotheticals” that have been canvassed in academic literature: see Birke 
Häcker, “Mistaken Gifts after Pitt v Holt” (2014) 67 Current Legal 
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Problems 333 at 361. One example cited is that discussed by Peter Birks: 
a homophobic uncle had made a gift to his nephew who is gay, 
unbeknownst to the uncle who had never considered the nephew’s 
sexual orientation before: see Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd Ed, 2005) at pp 149–150. Another strength of the 
English concept of “mistake” is that it better protects the recipients’ 
interest in the security of their receipts, given that ignorance (which 
includes forgetfulness and inadvertence) is a commonplace occurrence. 
There has been suggestion, however, that protection could be afforded 
through the change of position defence instead: see James Edelman & 
Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment in Australia (Oxford University Press, 
2006) at p 171. 
23.19 Under Singapore law, at least, there is a further and more 
nuanced consideration. In Anna Wee (above, para 23.1) (discussed in 
(2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 476, para 22.19), the Court of Appeal 
reserved conclusive opinion on whether “ignorance” ought to be 
recognised as an independent unjust factor under Singapore law. The 
discussion took place within the context of considering whether 
Singapore law should recognise a strict liability regime for cases of 
receipt of property transferred in breach of trust or fiduciary duty. 
Singapore law is presently disinclined from doing so. Mere causative 
ignorance (on the part of the claimant) is, however, not usually found in 
these cases as it is the errant trustee/fiduciary’s misappropriation that 
caused the receipt of the benefit. To seriously consider whether 
ignorance and what form of ignorance amounts to actionable mistake is 
thus imperative. 
23.20 Finally, turning to reflect upon the effect of the judgment in Lo 
Man Heng (discussed above at para 23.12), should the Court of Appeal 
decide to follow the English concept of “mistake”, pleadings based on 
“ignorance” may not necessarily permit an inference of a claim based on 
mistake. 
Free acceptance 
23.21 In Total English Learning Global Pte Ltd (above, para 23.2), the 
High Court had the opportunity to decide an unjust enrichment claim 
based on “free acceptance”, a controversial concept that is rarely 
discussed in local case law. The facts of the case have been summarised 
above at paras 23.2–23.3. The defendant franchisees’ counterclaim in 
unjust enrichment was based on “free acceptance”. In short, the 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were liable to pay the price of the 
returned ICR materials because the plaintiffs had “freely accepted” the 
said materials, knowing that the materials were not handed over to them 
gratuitously. As discussed above at para 23.3, the claim failed because 
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the matter was governed by contract. Independently of the contractual 
reason, the court was not satisfied that the plaintiffs had freely accepted 
the returned materials. In this connection, credence was given to the 
fact that there was a letter preceding the return of the materials on the 
same day stating that if the plaintiffs refused to accept the return of the 
ICR materials, they would be charged with the cost of storage of such 
materials and other incidental charges. In the court’s view (at [137]), 
therefore, the plaintiffs “had little choice” in accepting the returned ICR 
materials. 
23.22 Although the outcome was correct, the court’s reasoning 
warrants fuller consideration. Crucially, it is not beyond dispute that 
“free acceptance” should be accepted as an unjust factor. This 
controversy was indeed noted (tangentially in the discussion of the 
nature of an unjust enrichment claim) by the Court of Appeal in Anna 
Wee (discussed in (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 471, paras 22.17–
22.18). The Court of Appeal refrained from determining this debate 
conclusively until an appropriate occasion was to arise in the future, and 
one would have thought that Total English Learning Global Pte Ltd was 
such an occasion. Nevertheless, it did not appear that counsels had 
argued this anterior and more fundamental issue. An opportunity was 
thus missed. 
23.23 Even if the court were to accept that “free acceptance” is a 
recognised unjust factor under Singapore law, the real and more 
substantial reason for the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the returned ICR 
materials was the existing contractual arrangement between the parties, 
quite apart from the contractual arrangement operating as a bar to 
preclude a restitutionary claim. For this reason, it might be said that the 
plaintiffs had no choice but to take in the materials. It also follows that 
the threat in the letter of charging storage and related costs to the 
plaintiffs in the event of their refusal to take delivery had real bite to it. 
In fact, the plaintiffs would have no realistic choice of rejecting the 
materials, even in the absence of a threat of being charged such costs. 
Had there not been an existing contractual arrangement, the threat 
would have been an empty one and a commercial party would probably 
not have taken it seriously, as well as decline accepting the goods. 
23.24 In other words, tying in neatly with the contractual bar 
reasoning, the contractual arrangement between the parties justified 
both the defendants’ delivery of the unused ICR materials and the 
plaintiffs’ acceptance of the same without having to pay the defendants. 
There is nothing unconscientious in the plaintiffs’ conduct in this case, 
even if the court had accepted Birks’ concept of “free acceptance” based 
on unconscientiousness: see Peter Birks, “In Defence of Free 
Acceptance” in Essays on the Law of Restitution (Andrew Burrows ed) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) at p 105. 
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